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§ 30-3-3 8 
§30-3-5 7,18 
§ 78A-4-103(2)(b)(h) 6 
Rules: 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b) 6 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(b)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
Issue 1: Did the Court err in its Findings of Fact? 
Determinative Law: There is no constitutional provision, statute, 
ordinance, rule or regulation whose interpretation is wholly determinative. Utah R. 
Civ. Proc. 52(b) is relevant to the proceeding. 
Utah R. Civ. Proc 52 (b) reads: 
Rule 52. Findings by the Court: 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury 
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately 
its conclusions of law. Thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, which constitute the grounds of its action. 
Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that 
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded 
in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enterer findings 
of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in rule 41 (b). 
The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the grounds for its 
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decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56 and 59 when 
the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of 
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may 
amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for new 
trial pursuant to rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court 
without a jury, the questions of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings 
may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question had made in 
the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend 
them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties ro an issue of 
fact: 
( c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
( c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause: 
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for a challenge to a trial court's 
factual findings is clear error. See, Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. 1999 UT App. 130, 
ITS. 
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in the trial court at 
R. 434-455. 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in failing to award Petitioner 
alimony. 
Determinative Law: There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to 
be wholly dispositive or determinative of this issue presented on appal. U.C. A. § 
30-3-5 is relevant and one of central importance to the appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is lengthy and attached as part of the addendum. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for a trial court to fail to award 
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alimony is abuse of discretion. See, Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, fl 42. 
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue is preserved in the trial court at R. 
488, Trial Transcript, at 132:6, 133:24, 140:12, 226:4,7, 284:15, 287:19, 289:16, 
291:20. 
Issue 3. Whether the trial court erred in failing to award attorney's fees to 
Appellant. 
Determinative Law: There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to 
be wholly dispositive or determinative of this issue presented on appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 is relevant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 states, 
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees - temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate 
Maintenance, or Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 2, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any 
action to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony or division 
of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney 
fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the 
other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provisions for 
costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent time, child support, 
alimony or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and 
attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim 
or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against 
a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters in the record the reason 
for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide 
money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance 
of the other party and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or 
judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order or 
judgment. 
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Standard of Review: The standard of review is correctness. Jensen v. 
Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, H127. 
Preserved In the Trial Court: This issue is preserved in the trial court at R. 
488, Trial Transcript, at 144:22, 225:6, 228:14, 229:3, 269:14, 276:10, 11, 12, 14, 
277:3, 284:18, 289:22, 23, 24 25, 291:18, 293:22. 
Issue 4: Whether the trial court erred in finding certain property to be non-
marital. 
Determinative Law: There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to 
be wholly dispositive or determinative of this issue presented on appeal. 
Standard of Review: A trial court has considerable discretion concerning 
property [division] in a divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption of 
validity. Elman v. Elman. 2002 UT App 84,1f 17; Consequently, we will not disturb 
a property award unless we determine that there has been "a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted 
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion". Id. (Quoting Schaumberq v. 
Schaumberg. 875 P.598 at 602. 
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in the trial court at 
R. 488, Trial Transcript, at 14:13-22,16:22,23,17:14-21,18:9,10, 21:13,14,25,20-
25, 26:10-12, 26:16-19, 25, 30:2,5-7, 9-12, 43:13,14, 45:6-8, 175:10,11,14-22, 
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25,177:8,9,10-14, 186:23-25, 187:1, 8-25, 202:6-24, 203:10, 209:9-13, 264:6-8. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A^  Nature of the Case: 
This appeal is from a final judgment and order of the Third Judicial District 
Court, signed April 2, 2008. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and the Disposition Below: 
The trial Court awarded the properties located at 149 South 800 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and 244-250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake City, Utah, to 
Mr. Soderborg, without equitable distribution, as his separate property. The trial 
court also ordered no alimony for Mrs. Soderborg, and order each party to pay their 
own attorney's fees. 
Mrs. Soderborg, through this appeal, is seeking to have an equitable 
distribution or set-off of the properties above, is seeking an award of reasonable 
alimony, and is seeking to have an award of attorney's fees for the trial court and this 
appeal. 
(1 Statement of Facts: 
1. The parties to this action were previously husband and wife. The 
parties were divorced by a bifurcated decree in this action.( R. at 283-
284). 
2. Petitioner and Respondent were married on April 2,1988 in Las Vegas, 
Nevada. This divorce action was filed on March 31, 2006. (R. at 1-6). 
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3. One child was born as issue of this marriage, Erik, now age 20. He 
was born on November 18, 1988. ( R. at 1-6). 
4. There are four parcels of real property involved in this litigation as 
follows: 
a. 8526 South Colene Drive, Sandy, Utah 84094, 
b. 244-250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, 
c. 149 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
d. 155-157 South 800 East Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
(Colleen Drive, Trial Transcript, hereafter T.T., at 32:25, 33:1,2; Truman Ave., T.T. 
at 21:6; 149 S. T.T. at 7:6-9; 155-157 South T.T. at 30:13-16,25; 31:1,24,25; 32:1). 
5. For most of the approximately eighteen and one-half year term of this 
marriage, the Respondent has failed and refused to seek substantial 
gainful employment outside the home and outside managing the 
properties. 
(got B.S. degree in business from Westminster in 1992, T.T. at 19:23. 
20:6; never sought employment with any company or employer who would use 
business degree, T.T. at 20:1-10; worked as supervisor of security guards for Davis 
Security, 28-30 hours per week, in 1991-1992; T.T.at 20:11-21; had broker's 
license, T.T. as 9:11-13; occupation in terms of time and income generated was 
owner and operator rental properties, T.T. at 186:23-25; 187:1; his job was the 
apartments, T.T. at 209:9-13, even his apartments only generated between 15-20 
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hours per week, T.T. at 177:3-8). 
Therefore, virtually his entire labor and contribution to the support of the 
family unit during the marriage has been his labor performed improving 
the various parcels of rental property, and his labor in managing the 
same. (T.T. at 209:9-13) At the time of trial, he was employed part 
time with Salt Lake County Recreation. (T.T. at 177:3-14) However, 
Respondent received an education during the marriage of the parties, 
having achieved a business degree from Westminster College. The 
Respondent is able bodied and employable. He has been chronically 
underemployed during the entirety of the marriage, and during the 
pendency of this action. (See above, and T.T. 30, 13-16, "So by 1994, 
your primary occupation was restoring, repairing and managing these 
three properties that we've talked about, the 149 South 800 East, 157 
South 800 East, and the Truman Avenue property, correct? Yeah, the 
Truman property is actually two properties,...".). 
6. The Petitioner was employed by Utah Power and Light Company at the 
time of the parties' marriage (T.T. at 192,1-3), but she was 
subsequently retired with a medical disability in about 1996, due to a 
cancer diagnosis. (T.T. at 182:7-10; 192:11,12; 193:1-25; 194:1-12). 
She received income from her disability insurance of approximately 
$1,471.00 gross per month. (T.T. at 142:9-11, T.T. at Exhibit R-11). 
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The Respondent claimed that the Petitioner has income from her efforts 
to breed and market Shelty puppies, and that she sold two litters in 
2007. (T.T. at 167:1-25; 168:1-10) Petitioner does have Shelty dogs, 
and her dogs had litters of puppies in 2007. This endeavor is a hobby. 
She breeds these dogs and attends shows with the dogs. (T.T. at 
196:1-25; 197:1-13) However, given the expenses of attending the 
shows, the food and veterinary costs, and equipment costs for the dogs, 
this effort is not a profit-making concern. (T.T. at 197:9-13: also, 116:7-
18) 
The parties had certain motor vehicles at the time of trial. Specifically, 
the Respondent has a 2002 Oldsmobile Alero, a 1985 Dodge Ram 
Charger, and a 1964 Chevrolet Corvette. The Petitioner has a 1998 
Chevrolet Tahoe and a 1990 Viking fold-up trailer, and a one-half 
interest in a 1989 Winnebago motor home. (T.T. at Exhibits R-5, R-7, 
R-16, R-18, P-7, P-9, P-11). Petitioner asserts that the values of the 
motor vehicles are quite pedestrian, with the exception of the 1964 
Chevrolet Corvette. She asserted that the Chevrolet Corvette has a fair 
market value of approximately $75,000.00, and that it is a significant 
asset in this marriage. (T.T. at Exhibits P-7, P-9; T.T. at 55:14-21, 
112:12-16; 113:10,11). The Corvette was acquired during the course 
of the marriage and is a marital asset. (T.T. at 113:10). 
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9. At trial the Court below awarded all the property in U 4 above to 
Respondent as a non-marital asset, (excluding the Colene Drive 
property) but also awarded Respondent an interest in Petitioner's 
premarital Colene Drive home. ( R.at 456-462, Order of Distribution, 
Denial of Alimony, and Other Related Matters, p. 2 and 3). 
10. The Court awarded Mrs. Soderborg no alimony ( R. at 456-462, Order 
of Distribution, Denial of Alimony, and Other Related Matters, p. 5, paragraph 6). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Ms. Soderborg filed a Verified Petition for Divorce on Petition for Divorce 
following an 18 years marriage. 
Mr. Soderborg entered the marriage with virtually zero assets, but had 
acquired property through inheritance from his father a year before the marriage 
located at 149 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. This property was a five-
plex and had been sold to multiple buyers and sellers but was in such a decrepit 
condition and out of compliance with City building and zoning codes, that Mr. 
Soderborg's father eventually had to take the property back. 
The first four years of the marriage Mr. Soderborg devoted his full time 
labor to restore and maintain the property and to bring the property into 
compliance with City and zoning codes. He paid approximately $4,500 from his 
pre-marital assets to his father for this property and claims that the balance of the 
property was given to him as part of his inheritance. 
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The property located at 244-250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake 
City, Utah, was also owned by Mr. Soderborg's father. His father was unable to 
maintain the property and it became uninhabitable and was subject to citations 
and liens from the City of South Salt Lake if the property remained unrepaired. 
The father was elderly and unable to bring the property up to code. The 
Soderborg family had a series of meetings, and Mr. Soderborg agreed to 
"purchased" the property as an advance on his inheritance. Following the 
collapse of the roof on the property, the final agreed price was $40,000. This 
occurred in 1991, three years after the parties were married. 
Mr. Soderborg, again, undertook the project of restoring and repairing a 
seriously compromised parcel of real estate and his efforts to this end were his 
only efforts toward support of his family. 
Mrs. Soderborg brought into the marriage a home located at 8526 South 
Colene Drive, Sandy, Utah. She had purchased this home with her previous 
husband and received it in a previous divorce. 
Mr. Soderborg also purchased, during the marriage, a rental property at 
157 South 800 East in Salt Lake City. This property was also distressed, did not 
meet building codes and was not in compliance with zoning requirements for Salt 
Lake City. It has significant value, and has been brought into compliance by the 
efforts of Mr. Soderborg. 
During the course of the marriage, which was from 1988 through 2006, Mr. 
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Soderborg has maintained a practice of being chronically unemployed or 
underemployed. He has refused to seek and obtain any meaningful employment 
despite being healthy and well educated, and despite a strong economy at that 
time, and a strong employment market. His elective employment has been as a 
tennis instructor and a security guard. This elective employment constituted a 
minuscule part of the marriage. His acknowledged employment is a property 
owner and manager of the properties referenced above. 
Mr. Soderborg, as a result of his labor solely during the period of time in 
which he was married to Mrs. Soderborg, increased the value of his "separate" 
properties, that had virtually no value when he received them as they were 
distressed to the point of failing to pass City building ordinances and zoning 
codes, yet increased to a value exceeding one million dollars during the 
marriage. 
Mrs. Soderborg has been classified by her insurance carrier as totally 
disabled, and receives a monthly disability check in the amount of $1,470.00. 
However, she had accrued a retirement prior to the disability, and the Court 
divided the retirement equally, without due consideration that Mr. Soderborg had 
accrued no retirement, since his employment was managing the properties. 
Mrs. Soderborg is entitled to receive a benefit from the sole contribution to 
which Mr. Soderborg made to the marriage, i.e., his labor, and there should be an 
equitable division or set-off relating to the "separate" properties, he should pay 
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meaningful alimony in an eighteen and one-half year marriage to Mrs. Soderborg, 
who is disabled, and he should contribute to or pay her attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Findings of Fact in which the Court erred will be addressed in the 
individual arguments relating to alimony, attorney's fees and separate property 
issues. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD PETITIONER 
ALIMONY 
Alimony is, in effect, a continuation of each spouse's duty to support and 
maintain the other. The underlying purpose of alimony is to maintain as nearly as 
possible the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Paffelv.Paffel. 732 P.2d 
96 (Utah 1986), Rudman v. Rudman. 812 P.2d 73 (Utah App. 1991). Alimony is 
appropriate "to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from 
becoming a public charge". Eamesv.Eames. 735 P.2d 395,397 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987). 
Utah trial courts are accorded broad discretion in determining the need and 
the amount of alimony payments, and their award will not be disturbed unless a clear 
and prejudicial abuse of discretion is shown. Claus v. Claus. 727 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1986). However, a trial court must consider three factors in setting a reasonable 
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award of alimony: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) 
the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or herself: 
and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Throckmorton v. 
Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121, 124, (Ut. App. 1988) quoting Eames. supra, at 397. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5, has since set forth adding, in pertinent part, 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
and 
( c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with 
Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant factors and 
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living 
that existed at the time of trial. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of 
both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in 
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been 
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court 
may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding 
alimony. 
Mr. and Mrs. Soderborg were married a total of 18 and one-half years. When 
Mr. Soderborg married Mrs. Soderborg, he brought nothing in the way of assets. 
(T.T. 202:1-5). When he left the marriage, at the end of 18 years, he had amassed 
an approximate gross worth of over one million dollars (adding the appraisals on all 
of the properties without deductions for mortgages). This is particularly striking 
since, as Mr. Soderborg testified at trial, he had secured a Bachelor's Degree in 
Business during the marriage, yet he did not utilize by being paid for that degree by 
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any employer and his employment had been almost uniformly, throughout the 
marriage, that of managing his properties. He had a broker's license which he let 
lapse for disuse. There have been a brief period where he had worked as a 
supervisor of security guards and for the recreation department. His own testimony, 
though, was instructive: "Your primary labor during all of that time was to repair, own, 
operate, manage these rental units, correct? That, along with the time with Davis 
Security, and the buying and selling of cars to generate some income also" (T.T. 
186:19-22), and "...by far your primary operation, both in terms of your time and in 
terms of the income it generated, was your occupation as an owner and operator 
rental property? Yes". (T.T. 186:23-25; 187:1). 
On the other hand, Mrs. Soderborg was gainfully employed until stricken with 
bone cancer. Her employment was subsequently terminated, and evidence at trial, 
by Mrs. Soderborg, was that she is medically disabled (Trial Transcript at 182:9,10 
"...she was determined by her disability insurance carrier to be permanently and 
totally disabled, correct? Yes") She receives approximately $1,470.00 gross income 
per month through the disability insurance she had with a previous employer. This 
is her only source of income, and the Respondent's claim that she earns a 
substantial income from dogs is specious and unsupported by evidence at trial. (At 
best, a one time windfall of approximately $3,400, where the proceeds were eaten 
upbythecosts. T.T.at99:16-20;235:22,23;236:1-25;239:6; 196:1-15; 197:5("Do 
you make money on the dogs? No"); 197:9-13 ("...everything else with these dogs, 
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there's not much left over"). 
Mr. Soderborg also offered that Mrs. Soderborg, in addition to selling dogs, 
could continue to go to Deseret Industries (D.I. in the trial record), get some great 
deals, and turn around and sell these great deals at her own garage sale. ("Well, she 
always had something. Before that she was in the practice of - in the summer she 
would go around to all the Dl's in the valley, and buy things, and then hold big 
garage sales every Saturday on a main street, and she would make money doing 
that..."T.T. 168:11-15). 
The Court also heard testimony and received evidence that the Respondent 
operates multiple rental units; that he has made deductions from his income in a 
manner which is not proper and which ought not to be recognized by this Court for 
purposes of alimony assessment (T.T. 172-187), and that his income or revenue 
from the rental of the properties has been approximately $50-55,000.00 per year, net 
of expenses. Further, the evidence also showed that the Respondent is college 
educated. Having a degree in business; that he is able bodied; and that he is 
employable. His failure to obtain any significant employment is a willful 
underemployment. Income should have been imputed to the Respondent. 
The Court also heard evidence that each party has maintained and filed 
separate federal and state income taxes during the course of the marriage. The 
Respondent falsely contended that this reflects an intention of the Petitioner to keep 
their assets separate. In fact, this reflects the Petitioner's belief and opinion that the 
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Respondent was filing income tax returns claiming expenses that were not lawful 
deductions, and she refused to participate in this process. (T.T. 172-175; 212:22-25; 
213:1-7) 
The evidence also showed that Mr. Soderborg has the ability to pay alimony 
to Mrs. Soderborg, at the very least from the excessive expenses claimed in 
operating and managing the properties. Indeed, the Court, at a prior hearing, 
ordered alimony in the amount of $346.00 per month ( R. at 122-127), which was 
substantially lower than the $50,000-$55,000 yearly net rental income would allow. 
Further, Mr. Soderborg misrepresented to this Court his income and his ability to pay 
alimony during the period of temporary alimony in this case. Accordingly, he should 
be required to pay alimony based upon his true income, and that alimony should be 
increased retroactively to the commencement of temporary alimony in this case. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD PETITIONER 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
Under Utah law, an award of attorney's fees must be based on "the financial 
need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the requested fees". Stonehockerv. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 
11,1149. 
Substantial attorney's fees have been incurred in this case because of the 
Respondent's continuing and unreasonable refusal to recognize the true level of his 
income and to acknowledge the marital character of the property. In addition, 
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Petitioner should be awarded her court costs and fees because of the serious 
unreporting of an accurate picture of the Respondent's rental income and expenses 
as reflected above. 
The Findings of Fact relating to attorney's fees, cited at R. 434-455, 
specifically paragraph 9 inclusive, is rife with err. 
Paragraph 9(A) states that the Court has not received any testimony from any 
medical doctor that the Petitioner is disabled to the point where she cannot become 
employed, and even marshaling the evidence in favor of this position, which is 
essentially a line of questions by opposing trial counsel as to becoming a 
receptionist, a computer person or someone who answers telephones (T.T. 229:10-
25, 230:1-25; 231:1-25; 1-12;) but wholly ignoring that the Petitioner's response. 
Her response was that "her doctor won't release me", "there are spots there, but we 
haven't actively done anything", "right now there is a spot in my shoulder", and, of 
course, "...and then, after that, she was determined by her disability insurance carrier 
to be permanently and totally disabled, correct? Yes" (T.T. at 182:7-10). 
Indeed, she continues to receive a disability check, every month, in the amount of 
$1,470, because she has a disability. In the face of the commonly accepted 
actuarially driven insurance carrier, the presumption that they would continue to 
maintain disability coverage and payments on someone not disabled, is a virtual 
given. That is a reality check not perceived by the lower court at trial. 
Petitioner should be awarded her court costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
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this action as they are substantial by reason of the Respondent's unreasonable 
positions in this case, and his efforts to "freeze out" the Petitioner financially over the 
course of this litigation, both in failing to compromise on alimony when Mrs. 
Soderborg has been and is currently categorized as "disabled" and for his equally 
obstructive position on his claim of separate property. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING CERTAIN PROPERTY TO 
BE NON-MARITAL 
Respondent cannot articulate any legal basis upon which he can claim that the 
property acquired prior to marriage, or as an advance on inheritance, should not be 
equitably divided as marital property, to the extent that such property has enjoyed 
an increase in value during this lengthy marriage. 
Petitioner concedes that the division of property, under Utah law, is guided by 
the general rule that equity requires each party retain what he or she brought into the 
marriage. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). However, 
such property becomes marital property, and thus subject to equitable division when: 
(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to 
the enhancement, maintenance or protection of that property thereby 
acquiring an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been 
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges or 
where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of the interest therein to the 
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other spouse. Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304,308 (Utah 1998) 
(citations omitted); and Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The Mortensen court acknowledged that property divisions in 
divorce cases are to be "equitable" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5. Id. Equitable has been viewed by the Appellate Court, in a number 
of cases, and has held, in a more recent case affirming Mortensen, that 
"Any significant disparity in the division of the remaining property should 
be based on an equitable rationale other than on the sole fact that one 
spouse is awarded his or her gifts of inheritance" Stonehocker v. 
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, at 483, quoting Mortensen, at 308. 
In a 1990 Utah Court of Appeals case, the court looked at the 
contribution of the spouse not holding the separate property. The Court 
held that "the corporation was founded and operated through the joint 
efforts and joint sacrifices of the parties. In addition, because Mr. Dunn 
chose to work sixty to seventy hours per week, he left Mrs. Dunn with 
the sole responsibility of running the household and managing the 
household accounts. Further, she was left without his companionship 
and domestic contributions during those hours. While she was not his 
partner in the business of orthopedic surgery, she was his partner in the 
"business" of marriage"...". Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1318. 
Mrs. Soderborg was married to Mr. Soderborg, and for a 
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substantial period of time. His efforts to the marriage were to manage 
property, and primarily those in which he had a substantial interest by 
virtue of his inheritance. 
Respondent did not successfully argue during trial that the premarital property 
received through an advance on his inheritance was not enhanced through 
investments and effort attributable to both parties during the course of the marriage. 
Though Petitioner owned certain property before the marriage, this investment 
property was enhanced, maintained, and protected through the efforts, both physical 
and monetary, of both parties. In fact, the property went from being a "dump" in 
violation of City zoning code ordinances, to a property now capable of continuous 
rental and capable of generating income. It did so solely and exclusively through the 
application of substantial labor of the Respondent. Though the property itself was 
a premarital asset, the labor of the Respondent performed during the course of the 
marriage was a marital asset. The Petitioner, as the wife of the Respondent for 
some 20 years, has been entitled to him to support her and their minor child. The 
only real way in which he has done so is to labor upon this property, and the others, 
and thereby generate income. 
The same can be said of the Truman property which, though received by the 
Respondent in the course of the marriage as an advance in his inheritance, was also 
in a similar deplorable condition, and in legal jeopardy with the city in which it was 
located. Again, though the property was inherited, the Respondent's substantial 
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labors performed over many years were not inherited. That labor was a marital 
asset. 
Petitioner showed during trial, that during the course of the marriage, from 
1988 through 2006, the Respondent has maintained a practice of being chronically 
employed or underemployed; of refusing to seek and obtain any substantial gainful 
employment despite being physically healthy and well educated, and despite a 
strong economy and strong employment market. The Petitioner produced evidence 
that, despite repeated requests for the Respondent to obtain employment and help 
to support the parties' family, he insisted on being "employed" solely and exclusively 
on the properties described above, and buying and selling old cars. Also, in the mid 
1990's the Petitioner became disable and was no longer able to work for her 
previous income. Accordingly, there were insufficient funds needed to support the 
parties' minor child, to support their household, and to maintain them in any 
acceptable kind of lifestyle. From 1988 through 2006, the Petitioner was forced to 
engage in a repetitive practice of taking equity lines against the home to pay debts 
and obligations incurred for family and marital expenses. Essentially, by refusing to 
obtain employment, and especially by refusing to do so in the face of Petitioner's 
disability, the Respondent forced the parties to "cannibalize" the equity in the Colene 
property, to support the family. Respondent characterized this as Petitioner's use 
of equity in the Colene Drive property to pay off her "separate debts." In fact, these 
were marital debts incurred for family necessities, to support the parties and to 
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support their then-minor child. Petitioner asserts that the Respondent has wrongfully 
failed to support his family during the marriage, and that his claims the mortgage 
obligation on Colene should be paid exclusively by the Petitioner are further an effort 
on the part of the Respondent to abrogate his support obligations in this marriage. 
Therefore, Petitioner asserts that the following is the proper legal conclusions 
under the evidence of this case: that the amount of premarital and/or inherited funds 
attributable as the value of these properties should be awarded to the Respondent. 
However, any accrued value on any of the real estate, whether owned previously, 
acquired by an advance on inheritance, or purchased during the marriage, is marital 
property. And as such should be divided in an equitable fashion. 
Utah case law supports the rule that premarital property should be retained 
by the party who brought it into the marriage, but Utah case law is also clear that 
appreciation or augmentation in the property is a marital asset. Schaumberq v. 
Schaumberq, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In Schaumberq, the husband 
inherited money which he invested in a business building. After the initial 
investment, he refinanced the building several times. The issue in Schaumberq was 
whether the husband was entitled to back out and have returned to him more than 
the amount of his initial inheritance. The trial court ruled that, even though the 
husband used inherited funds to make the down payment on the building, he used 
marital funds to maintain and augment the asset. Consequently, the Court of 
Appeals found no error in the trial court's determination that appreciated portions of 
27 
the asset changed in character from separate property to marital property. 
The instant case is similar. Respondent came to own certain property, wither 
by purchasing it prior to the marriage, or by inheriting it during the marriage. 
However, he has refinanced the buildings several times. His refinancing under these 
circumstances has placed marital assets at risk. He has used a substantial marital 
asset (virtually all of his labor for 18 years) to maintain and augment these assets. 
Consequently, as in Schaumberq. all appreciation in these properties from the date 
of acquisition should be divided between the parties as marital assets. 
In the case of Moon v. Moon. 790 P.2d 52, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed 
a trial court's division of equity in a home, after awarding to the husband the value 
of the land where the home was built gifted to him prior to marriage, finding that the 
loan on the home was paid off during the marriage, and, therefore, the increase in 
the value beyond the value of the gifted land was marital. 
In Barber v. Barber. 792 P.2d 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the Utah Court of 
Appeals affirmed a trial court ruing that the improvements to a home were marital 
property and subject to equitable division. Similarly, in the instance case, the very 
substantial improvements to these properties, accomplished with the marital assets 
of Respondent's labors, render the increase in value to these properties subject to 
equitable division. See also Burt v. Burt . 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
where the Utah Court of Appeals declared that Mr. Burt could have awarded a 
portion of Ms. Burt's augmented inheritance under any of the Mortensen exceptions. 
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The Court held in Burt that the proper procedure for a trial court to follow is: 
The court should properly categorize the parties' property as part of the 
marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other. Each 
party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property 
and fifty percent of the marital property. But rather than simply enter 
such a decree, the Court should proceed to effect an equitable 
distribution in light of those circumstances and in conformity with our 
decision. That having been done, the final step is to consider whether, 
following appropriate division of the property, one party or the other is 
entitled to alimony. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166.1171, and n. 10 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
In the instant case, the fact of the Respondent's chronic unemployment 
during the marriage, but his extensive labor performed for these properties, 
is an "exceptional circumstance" within the meaning of Burt and irrespective 
of any other consideration. 
A. 149 South 800 East Property 
Respondent obtained a five-plex located at 149 South 800 East in Salt 
Lake City, immediately prior to the parties' marriage. He then devoted his 
entire labor for the first four years of the marriage toward the maintenance and 
restoration of this property, and the "legalization" of this property with the Salt 
Lake City government. He did virtually nothing else to contribute to the 
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support of the family during this time frame. Petitioner established during trial 
that this project involving the five-plex located at 149 South 800 East 
consumed the Respondent's full-time labors for years, and, thereafter, his 
general management and maintenance of all the properties has been his sole 
occupation. (Physical condition of the property a wreck, T.T. 14:13; ...get 
property habitable, T.T. 18:14-21; Performed lion's share of the labor, T.T. 
18:9,10; distressed property, T.T. 21:13,14; He personally performed labor on 
property to repair and restore, T.T. 25:20-25; Performed a lot of physical labor 
on the property, T.T. 26:10-12; Those 2 properties occupied your time more 
or less on a full time basis for a period of time? Yes. T.T. 26:16-19; ..it's 
ongoing, T.T. 26:25; personally maintained and general upkeep of property, 
T.T. 30:13,14; All real estate all in the process of being worked on, T.T. 
175:10,11,14-22; I've done all the labor, T.T. 175:25; Not sought any other 
employment other than part time with recreation department? No. T.T. 177:10-
14; [your] occupation in terms of time and income generated was owner and 
operator of rental property? Yes. T.T. 186:23-25; 187:1; at the time of the 
marriage, David had no money, T.T. 202:6-24; Who was supporting the 
household when you first got married? I was [Mrs. Soderborg], T.T. 202:3-5; 
I paid for everything [Mrs. Soderborg], T.T. 203:7. 
The five-plex located at 149 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, was 
originally owned by Respondent's father, George L. Soderborg. The evidence 
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during trial showed that, in the early 1980's, Respondent's father sold the 
property and then the property was subsequently sold and resold to others in 
a change of multiple buyers and sellers, apparently pursuant to Utah Uniform 
Real Estate contracts. By 1987, the property was in decrepit condition and 
was not in compliance with the City building and zoning codes. The 
Respondent's father was forced to accept back the property, as various 
buyers in the chain of title refused to comply with the contracts due to the 
noncompliance of the property with building and zoning codes, and defaulted 
in their obligations. Eventually, Respondent agreed to take over the problems 
of the property, to repair it, to petition the City to seek compliance with the 
building and zoning ordinances. He made a deal with his father to take over 
ownership of the property in 1987, approximately one year prior to the 
marriage of the parties. 
Thereafter, as set forth above, he labored for many years during the 
marriage, to resolve the zoning compliance problems, to repair and restore 
the property, to make it habitable, and lawful for human occupation, and to 
render it an income producing property. He paid only $4,500.00 from his 
premarital assets to his father for the property at 149 South 800 East. 
Respondent falsely asserted that the balance of the value of the property was 
given to him as part of an inheritance. However, the accounting of the 
inheritance acknowledged by Respondent in discovery, does not reflect he 
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received any of this property as an advance on his inheritance. Petitioner 
asserts that his claims that he took this property as an advance on inheritance 
are recently fabricated claims in the face of this divorce action. The evidence 
at trial showed the more likely reality that he paid back his father over time out 
of the marital funds. 
Respondent has kept the property at 149 South 800 East solely in his 
name, and has kept separate bank accounts during the course of the 
marriage. However, his only contribution to the support of his family during 
the marriage, of any substance, has been the labor performed to repair this 
property, and others, and to operate these properties as rental units. The 
Respondent's marital labor has greatly enhanced the value of this property. 
Because the value of the property has been significantly enhanced by a 
marital asset of the parties (the Respondent's labor during the marriage), the 
Petitioner is entitled to an equal share of the value of the property, less its 
premarital value of $4,500.00, as a marital property distribution. 
B. 244-250 East Truman Avenue Property 
The property located at 244-250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake 
City, Utah, was also owned by the Respondent's father, George L. Soderborg. 
The Respondent's father was eventually not able to maintain this property and 
it became uninhabitable, in dire need of substantial repairs, and was subject 
to citations and attempts by the government of the City of South Salt Lake, to 
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fine Respondent's father and lien the property if the property was not repaired 
and maintained. At the time of these occurrences, the Respondent's father 
was quite elderly and not capable of complying with the City's request for 
maintenance of the property. After as series of family meetings, the 
Respondent was the only sibling family member interested in the property and 
willing to take on the project of repairing the property. He agreed to 
"purchase" the property for $40,000.00 as an advance on his inheritance, this 
final price having been determined after the roof on the property collapsed. 
After acquiring this property as an advance on his inheritance, the 
Respondent, once again, undertook the project of restoring and repairing a 
seriously compromised parcel of real estate. During the time frame of this 
activity, the Respondent's only labor performed of any significance was to 
repair and restore the Truman Avenue property. The reason the property is 
in rentable condition is that a marital asset, all the labor and efforts of the 
Respondent, to the exclusion of other efforts to support his family, went 
exclusively into this property. The Petitioner therefore asserts that a marital 
asset has gone to the significant repair and an increase in value of this 
property. Other than the initial $40,000.00 advance on inheritance, the 
Truman property is a marital asset. 
C. 8526 South Colene Drive Property 
Petitioner brought into this marriage a home located at 8526 South 
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Colene Drive, Sandy, Utah, which she had purchased with her previous 
husband and which was awarded to her in a previous divorce. The fair market 
value of this property at the time of the parties' marriage was $90,200.00. 
D. 157 South 800 East Property 
During the marriage, the Respondent purchased a rental property at 
157 South 800 East in Salt Lake City. It was also a derelict or distressed 
property, which did not meet building code and was not in compliance with 
zoning requirements for Salt Lake City. Respondent has corrected that 
problem. The property is clearly a marital asset and has been appraised at 
the value of the real estate (dirt) only, by an appraiser, at approximately 
$210,000.00. 
Trial courts "need to be guided by the general purpose to be achieved 
by a property division, which is to allocate the property in a manner which best 
serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue their separate 
lives". Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, at 1148, quoting Burke v. Burke. 
733P.2d 133, 135. 
Also, in a concurring opinion, Justice Zimmerman in the Mortensen v. 
Mortensen case previously cited, states, "I certainly do not read the majority 
opinion as creating an exalted status for inherited or donated property that 
would effectively entail it or its value beyond the reach of a trial court 
fashioning a divorce decree. The overarching general rule remains the same 
34 
in any divorce case: to provide adequate support for the children of the 
marriage (cite omitted) and to divide the economic assets and income stream 
of the parties so as to permit both to maintain themselves after the marriage 
as nearly as possible at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage". 
Mortensen, at 310. 
CONCLUSION: 
When Mr. Soderborg entered the marriage with Mrs. Soderborg on 
April 2, 1988, he entered the marriage with virtually the clothes on his back. 
At the end of the marriage, he had accumulated property in an amount 
exceeding a million dollars. 
He leaves the marriage able bodied and capable of full time 
employment. He has no illnesses nor debilitating health issues. He has 
his Corvette to drive. 
Mrs. Soderborg, on the other hand, has bone cancer, albeit current 
non-active. What retirement she accumulated is to be divided one-half with 
Mr. Soderborg, who, because he focused his labors on increasing the 
values of the properties he managed and didn't work during the marriage 
except in isolated instances, didn't acquire any retirement and has nothing 
to split with Mrs. Soderborg. 
Mrs. Soderborg receives a monthly disability check in the amount of 
$1,470, a substantial reduction from the $20 per hour she had made while 
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gainfully employed with Utah Power and Light. With Utah Power and Light, 
at $20, she was making a monthly income of $3,467. Because of her 
disability, she has a monthly net loss of almost $2,000 a month. 
Mr. Soderborg would have Mrs. Soderborg supplement her disability 
income by selling dogs, a hobby she has, and which, according to trial 
testimony, she made all of approximately $3,400 when she sold 7 pups. 
Mr. Soderborg would also have Mrs. Soderborg resort to her past endeavor 
of shopping at Deseret Industries for specials, and then conducting garage 
sales on all of the items in which she was able to get a deal from the thrift 
store. This is his suggestion for her to make up the $2,000 she has lost as 
income because of her cancer. He proposed not to pay her any alimony, 
nor to share in any interest appreciation, at the very least, on all of the 
effort he put in in managing the properties. He proposed not to share any 
portion of all of the properties he received from inheritance. 
The primary asset in this case, by Mr. Soderborg, has been his labor. 
His entire economic contribution, as an employee, as a laborer, as a 
worker, as a business owner, was the labor he performed on the properties 
he acquired and managed. This is a man of some skills, who completed 
his business degree while married to Mrs. Soderborg, continued to acquire 
additional properties while married to Mrs. Soderborg, continued to 
improve on these properties to where initially, they had no value and were 
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a literal eyesore in the eyes of the City and violative of City ordinances and 
zoning codes to where, after 18 years, their value surpasses a million 
dollars. 
Mrs. Soderborg has shown a need for alimony, and Mr. Soderborg 
has an ability to pay, and Mrs. Soderborg should be entitled, because of 
her commitment to the marriage, to the standard to which she had become 
accustomed over eighteen years. Mr. Soderborg, because he has the 
ability to pay and Mrs. Soderborg has a need for payment, should pay Mrs. 
Soderborg's attorney's fees for trial. 
Finally, because it is a matter of simple fairness and only equitable, 
Mrs. Soderborg should share in the separate property acquired by Mr. 
Soderborg's marital labor. 
DATED this 4th day of May, 2009. 
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C. 
Grant W. P. Morrison 
Matthew G. Morrison 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 
B. Utah R. Civ. P. 52 
C. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
D. Order of Distribution, Denial of Alimony, and Other 
Related Matters 
E. Order from Hearing Held May 3, 2006 
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U T A H S T A T E L E G | S L A T U R E H o m e i g j t e M a p i C a | e n d a r j code/ConstitufHin | lluir.,i. | Sinuate | Sivin.h 
30-3-5. Disposition of property -- Maintenance and health care of parties and 
children - Division of debts -- Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and 
parent-time - Determination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties The court shall include 
the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for 
the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, 
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regard!! n i II ie 
court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, 
current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chaptei I Recovery 
Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning 
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If 
the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent 
children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial 
parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for 
the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for 
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the 
mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by 
modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights ot grandparents 
and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the 
child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the 
court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, 
among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or 
visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order 
is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' 
fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition 
was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a 
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visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation 
or 
parent-time right has been pieviously granted by the court, the court may award to the 
prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the 
prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered 
visitation or parent-time 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in iM<jriinninq alimony 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor 
spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor 
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor 
spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time 
of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the 
court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, 
base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may 
consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equdllLH !!HJ parties' 
respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in 
the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be 
considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one 
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses 
during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimonv 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children 
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each 
party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders 
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable 
at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs 
of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify that action 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not 
be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8) 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's tin 1111 i<il dbilil iU\ JUIIM II m \q 
expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that 
the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
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(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that 
a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or 
death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the 
action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with 
another person. 
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Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and 
recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the 
court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 
41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under 
Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more Mian one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its 
findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a 
new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has 
made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for fudgment, r r 
a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of iaw may 
be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in tli i mill 
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DAVID S. SODERBORG, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No 064901622 
Honorable Robert P. Faust 
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
THIS MATTER having come on regularly for trial on the 21st day of February 2008 and by 
a t j!ephoiiL conjnence on the l l d lis i>( 1* tun in n0PS tot a inlii » in 1hc m Utci all before the 
Honorable Robert P. Faust, Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG appearing in person and by and 
through her attorney of record, Mar> < < oipoion ut < < »RPC >1!< i J t\ }} I! i I \MS \} < and 
Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG appearing in person and by and through his attorney, Paul 
I! Liapis of PAUL H. LIAPS, L.C., and each of the parties having been duly sworn and examined 
under oath,.and expert lestimony having baen received by line Conn, and JncunioiUav e\i(luiee 
having been marked and received by the Court, and the parties having been previously divorced 
- ..:•.! A ,iijutLn:--a uctrcc oi :)ivorce entered on the 15th day of December 2007, and the Court 
having heard arguments of counsel for Petitioner and Respondent, andb i\ ine ;; r<.\ •.•<]: v :v ' ^1 
sufficiency of the evidence so adduced, and being folly advised in the premises, the Court does now 
make, adopt, and find the follov • ing: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. ^moner and Respondent have been bona fide and actual residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) months immediately prior to the filing of Petitioner's 
Complaint and Respondent's Counterclaim herein. 
2. Petitioner and R espondent are husband and w if e, ha\ ing been married on the 2nd day 
of April 1988 in Las Vegas, Nevada and having separated on April 8, 2006. 
3. One (1) child was born as issue of this marriage, namely, Erik P., now age nineteen 
(19), and emancipated. 
4 The Court makes the following findings with regard to the real property acquired by 
(A; The Court finds that this property was acquired by the Respondent prior to 
this marriage arid specifically from his father, George L. Soderborg, pursuant to a handshake 
agreement reached by them in Ibo/. ] ' • * : ' !"* l • '• '• j. '\-:*y • ;<j ->• * u « i " - i .-»; 
previously to that agreement sold the property to several different buyers and that all sales 
failed, and the proper ty \ as taken back by Respondent' s father in 198 7 
(B) I he Court finds that in 1987, the Respondent used the interest owed in a 
premarital condominium located at 5910 South Sultan Circle. Murray, Utah to initi -ih 
finds Respondent transferred cash of $4500 toward the purchase and received the balance of 
I lie value ol that property from., his father as a gift and/or his inheritance. 
(C) The Court finds that the Respondent thereafter opened a separate bank 
account solely in his name with First Federal Savings & Loan, no. 680030958, and that all 
is for the repairs, rentals, and obligations were processed through that accoi mtsoleh < b;; r 
the Respondent. The Court farther finds that the successor bank account with America First 
Credit Union., no.74600-884987 7, has-likewise been maintained solely in the name of the 
Respondent and that all subsequent monies collected and/or paid for this property have been 
deposited into that account and distributed from that account solely under the name of the 
(1); The Court finds that the Petitioner has never placed any monies into the 
operation and maintenance of this property, has never WOPKCJ to repair and maintain this 
3 
proreity. his-vv/i-• »li. * >< -v • . • \ d / v : ' b «* i noway 
has enhanced the value of this property through her efforts, investment, or actions. 
fl1 ~ '..u'.:; i. sawa iinds that this property has not been commingled in any way 
by the Respondent in his operation of this property. 
(F) The Court finds that the Respondent has maintained this rental property, its 
bank accoi mt, the fi iiids collected, and its obligations sepai ate and apart throughout the 
course of this marriage. 
(( J i J he Court finds that the Respondent has maintained this property separate and 
apart and that the property should be n\, in1 * ;-: -i f ; ^ 
premarital property, free and clear of any interest of the Petitioner. 
5. Hit" i \ iiirt make;, the follow in^ findings with regard to the real property acquired by 
the parties during the course of the marriage located at 244-250 East 1 iimiai. ,--^ - .•:: 
Lake5 Utah: 
i A i IheCoiiii finds llial ilns property was inhetiU'il h\ (lie Respondent Ironi Ins 
father, George L. Soderborg. The Court finds that initially in the spring of 1991, the 
Respondent's father appi oached R espondent to assist him with his property in its then state 
of disrepair. 
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(B) . lV--r ' t v ] i ^ - ' - ^ l v P ^ . ' r . ! - i ?hi^< - \ ••* ^ > e ^ . i . . f u s i n g 
the best manner in which to handle this property and subsequently held a meeting and an 
inspection of the property, • and. from that concluded that none of Respondent's siblings 
wanted the property and that the Respondent would purchase this property for $45,0001 ising 
his inheritance from his father to purchase the property. The Court further finds that shortly 
thereafter., fhernot'tollapMitl, .md (he property's \ aim: was i educed to $40,000 by agreement 
of his siblings. 
(C) I r.c court lunhcr finds that upon the death of the Respondent's father, the 
sum of $40,000 was deducted from the Respoinlnif • shnre ni'the probate estule and Mnt in 
addition to that $40,000 value, the Respondent received the sum of $26,266 which he has 
invested either iniu this pioperl v • T iiiln the Petitioner's premarital home. 
(D) The Court finds that the Respondent initially acquired an obligation solely in 
his name with Beneficial Mortgage Company of Utah in the sum of $ 19,600 to begin repairs 
of this propei ty. ' rhat obligation w as si ibsequently revised on Februai y 18, 1.994 I he Court 
finds that both such obligations were solely in the name of the Respondent, that Petitioner 
ha.> ne^  -: : j--e {:e>piy.^ibii;i> : -• c;: . -\ Mans nor in any way has she ever made payments 
toward this, obligation. 
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(E) The Court finds that the Respondent opened a bank account with JP 
Morgan/Chase Bank, no. 913349877, in his sole name and has utilized that account in the 
operation of this property. The Court further finds that the funds collected from this rental 
property and the monies paid toward the costs to operate this rental has all been deposited 
into and paid from this account by the Respondent. 
(F) The Court finds that Petitioner in no way has contributed to or invested any 
monies into this property or the property's bank accounts, has not repaired, maintained, or 
rented the property, has not collected any rental income from the property, and in no way has 
enhanced the property during the course of this marriage. 
(G) The Court finds that the Respondent has not commingled this property or its 
bank accounts in any way during the course of this marriage. The Court finds the 
Respondent has deposited all of the rentals into the Chase Bank account, has paid all 
Jj^ J^T expenses for the operation of this company from the Chase Bank account, and that the 
Petitioner in no way has become involved or invested any monies into this account. 
(H) The Court finds that this property was initially owned by the Respondent's 
grandparents, who passed this property to Respondent's parents, and subsequently to the 
Respondent in the manner set forth above. 
6 
(I) The Court finds that the Respondent has maintained this property separate and 
apart and that the property should be awarded to the Respondent as his inherited property, 
free and clear of any interest of the Petitioner. 
6. The Court makes the following findings with regard to the real property located at 
8526 South Colene Drive, Sandy, Utah: 
(A) The Court finds that the Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG initially 
acquired this home in 1978 from a former father in law. 
(B) The Court finds that on April 1, 1987, approximately a year prior to the 
parties' marriage, the Petitioner borrowed $64,000 from National Mortgage Company against 
this property which she had previously owned free and clear. 
(C) The Court finds that the parties married on April 2, 1988. 
(D) The Court finds that the Petitioner approached the Respondent in the latter 
part of the year 1989, inquiring of his interest to invest monies into this home to purchase 
one-half QA) of the equity at that time. The Court finds that the parties conducted such a 
meeting and concluded that one-half (Yz) of the then equity would be $20,000. The Court 
further finds that the parties agreed that Respondent could pay that $20,000 investment over 
a period of time and that he initially paid to the Petitioner two (2) checks in the sum of $9500 
and $500 cash which he borrowed from his father, for a total payment of $ 10,000. The Court 
7 
further finds the check for $5,000 was dated December 29,1989 and the check for $4500 was 
dated January 26,1990 and that Respondent then paid the additional $500 cash to complete 
the first half of the payment. 
(E) The Court finds that the title in this property has remained in Petitioner's 
name throughout the term of this marriage. 
(F) The Court finds that during the marriage, the Petitioner refinanced the home 
withNAMC on June 14,1993, borrowing $74,250. The Court finds that Petitioner paid the 
balance of the first mortgage and used the additional monies borrowed to pay off her sole and 
separate credit cards and debts, and that this loan was taken solely by Petitioner without the 
knowledge of the Respondent. 
(G) The Court finds that Respondent then advanced payment of the second half 
of his $10,000 equity purchase in 1998, making payment for the purchase of a new furnace 
in the sum of $1750, new carpeting for the house in the sum of $2,141, painting of the 
interior of the home in the sum of $1,045, installation and finishing of hardwood floors of 
$750, installation of new tiles of $357, installation of central air conditioning of $2,573, the 
purchase of a new refrigerator for $751, the purchase of additional furniture from RC Willey 
of $830, and the purchase of a new dryer in the sum of $318.36, for a total additional 
investment of $ 10,515.36. 
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(H) The Court finds that Petitioner, again without Respondent's knowledge, took 
an equity line loan against the home on March 8, 2001 with America First Credit Union in 
the sum of $25,000 using those monies to pay off her sole and separate debts and credit 
cards. 
(I) The Court finds that on November 22, 2004, Petitioner again refinanced the 
America First Credit Union equity line, borrowing $30,000, using said monies to pay off the 
balance of the old credit line of approximately $25,000 and the remaining sum of 
approximately $5,000 was used to pay off her sole and separate debts and credit cards. 
(J) The Court finds that Petitioner and Respondent jointly contributed to the 
mortgage payments from the marriage until November 1994 when the Respondent then 
assumed payment of all of the monthly mortgage payments and utilities up to the date of the 
parties' separation on April 8, 2006. 
(K) The Court finds that without the knowledge of Respondent, Petitioner again 
refinanced the first mortgage on the home on March 22, 2006 with Homecoming Financial 
Network borrowing $164,500. The Court finds that this mortgage was done one (1) month 
prior to the parties' separation. 
(L) The Court further finds that from the newly financed proceeds, the Petitioner 
paid the prior first mortgage of $61,413.43, paid off the America First Credit Union line of 
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credit of $45,747.03, and paid off additional credit cards and debts solely in her name of 
$52,227.65. 
(M) The Court further finds that Respondent has presented evidence and 
documents setting forth the use by Petitioner of the additional monies borrowed from the 
refinance of the home on March 22,2006 to pay her sole and separate debts. The Court finds 
Petitioner used those proceeds to pay her credit cards and debts for the following: 
i. Payment of food charges $ 681.80 
ii. Medical expenses $ 736.26 
iii. Computer purchase and repair expenses $ 1,084.41 
iv. Home repairs $10,379.69 
v. Food for the minor son Erik $ 774.81 
vi. Auto repairs for her vehicle $ 5,202.91 
vii. Gold's Gym membership $ 589.50 
viii. Payment to the Petitioner's Chase credit $ 8,689.00 
card, no. 40800111616965 
ix. Payments to Petitioner's Bank of America Visa $ 9,597.67 
account no. 4427-1000-2906-6185, of $9,597.67 
x. Payments to three (3) America First obligations $ 14,384.70 
($5,048 + $4,301.47 + $5,035.23) 
xi. Payment of Petitioner's Mervyn' s account $ 464.54 
xii. Payment of Petitioner's Capital One charge $ 671.00 
xiii. Payment of Petitioner's AT&T credit card, 
no. 5491-1303-5433-6174 $ 8,957.00 
xiv. Payment of bicycles $ 325.41 
TOTAL: $62,538.70 
(N) The Court finds that the Petitioner improperly and without the knowledge of 
the Respondent has used a portion of his equity in the refinancing which occurred on March 
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22, 2006, a month prior to the filing of the divorce in this matter, and that the Respondent 
should not be penalized by the Petitioner's unilateral acts of borrowing these monies for the 
payment of her sole and separate debts. The Court finds that to determine the equity of this 
home, the mortgage balance owing prior to the taking of this refinanced mortgage on March 
22,2006 should be the mortgage balance used and subtracted from the appraised value in the 
determination of the marital equity in this home. 
(O) The Court finds that by the actions of the parties and their agreement to allow 
Respondent to purchase into the equity of this home and that by the subsequent payments of 
monies made by Respondent for the mortgage, improvements, and repairs, including an 
additional $11,031.25 that Respondent invested in this home between March 30, 1990 
through June 22, 2005, that the parties are equal owners in this home and that it is entirely 
a marital asset. 
(P) The Court finds that the home was appraised by Mr. Jerry Webber for 
^275,000, that the marital equity in this home is the sum of $174,982, and that each party is 
an equal owner of this equity. 
(Q) The Court finds that this property should be awarded solely to the Petitioner 
It the value of $174,982 and that she should assume and pay all of the mortgage, debts, and 
obligations against this property and hold the Respondent harmless therefrom. 
11 
7. The Court makes the following findings with regard to the real property acquired by 
the parties during the course of the marriage located at 157 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah: 
(A) The Court finds that the Respondent purchased this unit under a Uniform Real 
Estate contract during the course of the marriage for $65,000. 
(B) The Court finds this property to be a marital acquisition. The Court finds this 
property to have been appraised by Mr. Jerry Webber for a value of $219,200 based solely 
upon the value of the raw land and not any improvements thereon, and that there exists a 
current mortgage balance owing to Mr. Grant Maxwell of $28,681, resulting in an equity in 
this property of $181,319. The Court further finds that Mr. Webber's appraisal noted the 
zoning problems for this property and his conclusions that the best way to value this property 
was for the value of the raw land. 
(C) Thf> Court finds this to be a marital property which equity should be divided 
oetween the parties. 
8. The Court makes the following findings with regard to the personal property acquired 
by the parties during the course of the marriage: 
(A) The Court finds that the Petitioner has acquired a Pacific Corp/Rocky 
Mountain Retirement Account with a current balance of $24,454, plus appreciation since the 
statement's date. The Court finds this to be a martial asset and that the account should be 
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awarded to the Petitioner at the stated value. 
(B) The Court finds that the Petitioner during the marriage has acquired a 1998 
Chevrolet Blazer four-door LS four-wheel drive vehicle which is valued at $6450, a 1990 
Viking fold-up trailer valued at $1500, and a one-half QA) interest in a 1989 Winnebago 
motor home with a value of $5,000 and that these vehicles should be awarded to the 
Petitioner at the stated values. 
(C) The Court finds that the Respondent during the marriage acquired a 2002 
Oldsmobile Alero automobile valued at $4,912, a 1964 Chevrolet Corvette V-6 automobile 
valued at $50,000, and a 1985 Dodge Ramcharger valued at $1,000 and that these vehicles 
should be awarded to Respondent at the stated values. 
(D) The Court finds that the Petitioner owns seven (7) Shelty dogs, indoor and 
outdoor kennels and equipment which the Court finds has a value of $4500 which items 
should be awarded to the Petitioner at the stated value. 
(E) The Court finds that Petitioner currently has in her home furniture, 
furnishings, and appliances valued at $6500 and that said property should be awarded to the 
Petitioner at the stated value. 
(F) The Court finds that the Respondent has a small amount of furniture in his 
apartment which should be awarded to him with a value of $500. 
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(G) The Court finds that to equalize the division of these personal property items, 
the Respondent should pay to the Petitioner the sum of $9,673. 
9. With regards to the Petitioner's health and income, the Court makes the following 
findings: 
(A) The Court finds that Petitioner has not received any testimony from any 
medical doctor that the Petitioner is disabled to the point where she cannot become employed 
and can contribute to her own earnings. 
(B) The Court finds that the Petitioner's current receipt of disability from a private 
insurance carrier does not convince the Court that her subsequent employment would 
disallow her receipt of disability from that private insurance policy under the laws of the 
State of Utah. The Court further finds that the Petitioner has not proven that she is unable 
to work. 
(C) The*Court finds the Petitioner's current yearly income from her private 
insurance disability to be $17,652 per year, without consideration of any additional income 
shFm^denve from her dogs, the sale of puppies, or other ventures that she was engaged in 
during the marriage. 
(D) The Court finds that the Petitioner's net yearly net income is almost equal to 
^Respondent ' s 2007 income of $19,321. 
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(E) The Court finds that any shortfall in earnings as a comparison between the 
Respondent's earnings and Petitioner's earnings can clearly be compensated to Petitioner by 
her ability to become employed. 
(F) The Court specifically finds that the Petitioner is underemployed by at least 
"the difference between the Respondent's gross monthly income and the Petitioner's gross 
monthly income. 
(G) The Court finds that the Petitioner has not proven a need for support nor an 
ability on the part of the Respondent to pay alimony and therefore denies the award of any 
alimony to the Petitioner. 
(H) The Court has reviewed the Petitioner's and Respondent's average living 
expenses and finds those expenses to be reasonable for each party. 
10. With regards to the Respondent's earnings, the Court finds: 
(A) That the Respondent's adjusted gross monthly income from the three (3) 
apartment units is $2,487.72 and that from said amount, taxes should be deducted which 
would then reduce his income to the sum of $1932 per month. 
(B) The Court finds that the Respondent during the pendency of this matter was 
forced to acquire a second job to assist in the payment of the alimony that was awarded to 
Petitioner under the temporary order. 
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(C) The Court finds that the Respondent does not have the ability to contribute 
support to the Petitioner in the form of alimony. 
(D) The Court finds that the Respondent does not have a need for alimony from 
the Petitioner nor has he proved an ability for Petitioner to pay him alimony. 
(E) The Court denies the award of any alimony to either the Petitioner or the 
Respondent. 
(F) The Court has reviewed the Respondent's average living expenses and finds 
those expenses to be reasonable. 
11. The Court finds that the Respondent has disclosed his current debts and obligations 
as follows: 
CREDITOR PURPOSE MONTHLY BALANCE 
Home Savings Mortgage -149 South $ 965.64 $ 115,998 
Grant Maxwell Mortgage -157 South $ 530.00 $ 28,681 
Beneficial Finance Credit Line-Apartments $ 475.55 $ 44,983 
Discover Card Credit Line $ 100.00 $ 2,313 
Chase MasterCard Credit Line $ 400.00 $ 4,276 
The Court finds that the Respondent should assume and pay these debts and obligations and 
hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom. 
12. The Court finds that the Petitioner's debts and obligations are a first mortgage on the 
home at852?TS8!IllnColene Drive, Sandy, Utah with GMAC Mortgage of approximately $164,000 
and should assume said obligation and hold the Respondent harmless therefrom. The Court further 
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finds that Petitioner should assume and pay any taxes and insurance on the home and hold the 
Respondent harmless therefrom. The Court further finds that Petitioner should assume and pay any 
debts and obligations she has incurred in her own name since the separation of the parties in this 
matter, and she should hold the Respondent harmless therefrom. 
13. The Court finds that each party has incurred attorney fees and that each party should 
assume and pay their own attorney fees and costs. The Court finds that neither Petitioner nor 
Respondent has the ability to pay one another's attorney fees. The Court further finds that the 
Petitioner has an outstanding attorney's lien to former counsel Richard S. Nemelka and that said 
obligation should be assumed and paid by Petitioner and she should hold Respondent harmless 
therefrom. 
14. The Court finds that Petitioner desires to be restored to her former name of Barbara 
Ray. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and adopts its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG is awarded the following premarital/inherited 
assets that he brought into the marriage as his sole and separate property, free and clear of any 
interest of the Petitioner: 
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(A) The property located at 149 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, together 
with the obligation owing thereon to Home Savings, the taxes, and all other debts and 
obligations owing thereon. 
(B) The property located at 244-250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake, Utah, 
together with the obligation owing thereon to Beneficial Finance, the taxes, and all other 
debts and obligations owing thereon. 
(C) The bank account with America First Credit Union for the property at 149 
South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(D) The bank account with Chase Bank/JP Morgan used for the property at 244-
250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake, Utah. 
(E) All of the furniture, furnishings, appliances, and fixtures in both parcels of 
real property referenced in this paragraph. 
2. Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG is awarded the following assets as the marital 
division herein; 
(A) The real property located at 8526 South Colene Drive, Sandy, Utah, together 
with all the obligations, taxes, and insurance owed thereon and free and clear of any interest 
of the Respondent. 
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(B) All of furniture, furnishings, fixtures, and appliances currently in the home. 
(C) The 1998 Chevrolet Blazer automobile, 
(D) The 1990 Viking folding trailer. 
(E) Petitioner's one-half Q/i) interest in the Winnebago motor home. 
(F) Her banking and depository accounts with America First Credit Union and 
Credit Union One. 
(G) Her personal effects and belongings. 
3. Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG is awarded the following assets as the marital 
division herein; 
(A) The rental property located at 157 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
together with all the furniture, furnishings, fixtures, and items in the rental unit and subject 
to the Respondent's making of the first mortgage payment to Grant Maxwell, all taxes and 
insurance, and any other obligations owing thereon. 
(B) The 2002 Oldsmobile Alero automobile. 
(C) The 1964 Chevrolet Corvette automobile. 
(D) The 1985 Dodge Ramcharger. 
(E) His personal banking and depository accounts with Wells Fargo Bank. 
(F) The furniture, furnishings, and appliances currently in his possession. 
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(G) His personal effects and belongings. 
4. To equalize the division of the marital estate, Respondent is ordered to pay to 
Petitioner the sum of $9,673. 
5. Petitioner and Respondent are each ordered to sign all quit-claim deeds and titles 
necessary to transfer the real and personal property into the name of the party receiving these items. 
6. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent is awarded any alimony from the other, and that 
right is hereby terminated. 
7. Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG is ordered to assume, pay, and hold the 
Respondent harmless therefrom the first mortgage on the home at 8526 South Colene Drive, Sandy, 
Utah with GMAC Mortgage, the taxes and insurance on the home, all of the credit cards, debts, and 
obligations Petitioner currently has in her name and which she has incurred during the marriage and 
those incurred following the separation, together with all attorney fees and costs incurred in this 
matter including the attorney's lien owed Richard S. Nemelka, Esq. 
8. Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG is ordered to assume, pay, and hold the 
Petitioner harmless from the mortgage owing to Home Savings on the property at 149 South 800 
East, the Uniform Real Estate Contract amount owed Grant Maxwell for the purchase of the property 
at 157 South 800 East, the Beneficial Finance credit line used in conjunction with the apartments, 
the Respondent's Discover Card, the Respondent's Chase MasterCard, all taxes and insurance owed 
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on the real properties awarded him, and any debts and obligations he has incurred in his own name 
since the filing of the Complaint in this matter. 
9. Petitioner and Respondent are each ordered to assume and pay their own attorney fees 
and costs incurred in this litigation. 
10. Petitioner is restored to her former name Barbara Ray. 
11. The parties are ordered to execute any and all documents necessary to carry forth the 
intent of this Order. 
DATED this^sL day of April 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
this day of April 2008: 
<£wi-—*• 
HON. ROBERT P. 
Third Judicial District Judge 
By: 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
this 29th day of February 2008 to the following: 
Via Fax # 363-8243 & US Mail 
Mary C. Corporon, Esq. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C 
405 South Main Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereb> certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
this 1* day of April 2008 to the following: 
Mary C. Corporon, Esq. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C 
405 South Main Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
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Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA SODERBORG, 
vs. 
DAVID S. SODERBORG, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF DISTRIBUTION, 
DENIAL OF ALIMONY, AND 
OTHER RELATED MATTERS 
Civil No-064901622 
! Honorable Robert P. Faust 
| Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
THIS MATTER having come on regularly for trial on February 21,2008 and by telephone 
conference on February 22,2008 for ruling in this matter, all before the Honorable Robert P. Faust, 
Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG appearing in person and by and through her attorney of record, 
March C. Corporon of CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C., and Respondent DAVID S. 
SODERBORG appearing in person and by and through his attorney, Paul H. Liapis of PAUL H. 
LIAPIS, L.C, and each of the parties having been duly sworn and examined under oath, and expert 
testimony having been received by the Court, and documentary evidence having been marked and 
received by the Court, and the parties having been previously divorced through a Bifurcated Decree 
of Divorce entered on December 15, 2007, and the Court having heard arguments of counsel for 
Petitioner and Respondent, and having inquired into the legal sufficiency of the evidence so adduced, 
and being fully advised in the premises, and the Court having conducted a telephone conference on 
February 22,2008 wherein the Court issued its ruling, and the Court having made and entered herein 
its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and upon motion of Paul H. Liapis of PAUL 
H. LIAPIS, L.C., attorney for Respondent: 
NOW, THEREFOR, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG be and he is hereby awarded the following 
premarital/inherited assets that he brought into the marriage as his sole and separate property: 
A. The property located at 149 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, together 
with the obligation owing thereon to Home Savings, the taxes, and all other debts and 
obligations owing thereon. 
B. The property located at 244-250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake, Utah, 
together with the obligation owing thereon to Beneficial Finance, the taxes, and all other 
debts and obligations owing thereon. 
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C. The bank account with America First Credit Union for the property at 149 
South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
D. The bank account with Chase Bank/JP Morgan used for the property at 244-
250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake, Utah. 
E. All of the furniture, furnishings, appliances, and fixtures in both parcels of 
real property referenced in this paragraph. 
2. Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG be and she is hereby awarded the following 
assets as the marital division herein as her sole and separate property. 
A. The real property located at 8526 South Colene Drive, Sandy, Utah, together 
with all the obligations, taxes, and insurance owed thereon and free and clear of any interest 
of the Respondent. 
B. All of furniture, furnishings, fixtures, and appliances currently in the home. 
C. The 1998 Chevrolet Blazer automobile. 
D. The 1990 Viking folding trailer. 
E. Petitioner's one-half (V£) interest in the Winnebago motor home. 
F. Her banking and depository accounts with America First Credit Union and 
Credit One. 
G. Her personal effects and belongings. 
3. Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG be and he is hereby awarded the following 
assets as the marital division herein as his sole and separate property: 
A. The rental property located at 157 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
together with all the furniture, furnishings, fixtures, and items in the rental unit and subject 
to the Respondent's making of the first mortgage payment to Grant Maxwell, all taxes and 
insurance, and any other obligations owing thereon. 
B. The 2002 Oldsmobile Alero automobile. 
C. The 1964 Chevrolet Corvette automobile. 
D. The 1985 Dodge Ramcharger. 
E. His personal banking and depository accounts with Wells Fargo Bank. 
F. The furniture, furnishings, and appliances currently in his possession. 
G. His personal effects and belongings. 
4. To equalize the division of the marital estate, Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG 
be and he is hereby ordered to pay to Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG the sum of $9,673. 
5. Petitioner and Respondent be and they are each ordered to sign all quit-claim deeds 
and titles necessary to transfer the real and personal property into the name of the party receiving 
these items. 
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6. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent is awarded any alimony from the other, and that 
right is hereby terminated. 
7. Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG be and she is hereby ordered to assume, pay, 
and hold the Respondent harmless from the first mortgage on the home at 8526 South Colene Drive, 
Sandy, Utah with GMAC Mortgage, all of the taxes and insurance on the home, all of the credit 
cards, debts, and obligations Petitioner currently had in her name during the marriage and those 
incurred following the separation, together with all attorney fees and costs incurred in this matter 
including the attorney's lien owed Richard S. Nemelka, Esq. 
8. Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG be and he is hereby ordered to assume, pay, 
and hold the Petitioner harmless from the mortgage owing to Home Savings on the property at 149 
South 800 East, the Uniform Real Estate Contract amount owed Grant Maxwell for the purchase of 
the property at 157 South 800 East, the Beneficial Finance credit line used in conjunction with the 
apartments, the Respondent's Discover Card, the Respondent's Chase MasterCard, all taxes and 
insurance owed on the real properties awarded him, and any debts and obligations he has incurred 
in his own name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter. 
9. Petitioner and Respondent are each ordered to assume and pay their own attorney fees 
and costs incurred in this litigation. 
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10. Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG be and she is hereby restored to her former 
name of Barbara Ray. 
11. The parties are ordered to execute any and all documents necessary to carry forth the 
intent of this order. 
12. The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to do and perform all the matters and 
things required by each of them to be done herein. 
DATED this 2^ day of April 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
this day of April 2008 
By: 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
this 29th day of February 2008 to the following: 
Via Fax # 363-8243 & US Mail 
Mary C. Corporon, Esq. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C 
405 South Main Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
SECOND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
this 31st day of March 2008 to the following: 
Mary C. Corporon, Esq. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C 
405 South Main Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
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RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396 
STEPHEN S. NEMELKA #9239 
NEMELKA & NEMELKA 
6806 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801)568-9191 
Fax: (801)568-9196 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 




DAVID S. SODERBORG, 
Respondent. 
ORDER FROM HEARING HELD 
MAY 3,2006 
Civil No. 064901622 
Judge: R-eth Kouyyb 
Commissioner: Casey 
The parties Motions came on for hearing before the Honorable T. Patrick Casey of the 
above-entitled Court on the 3rd day of May, 2006. Petitioner being present and being represented 
by her attorney, Richard S. Nemelka, and Respondent being present and being represented by his 
attorney, Paul H. Liapis, and a Stipulation having been entered into by and between the parties as 
to the majority of the issues, and proffers of evidence and argument having been made to the 
FILES DISTRICT COUHT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 3 1 2006 
Court in regard to the remaining issues, and the Court having made it's recommendation, and 
good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Petitioner is hereby awarded the temporary use and possession of the home and 
residence located at 8526 Colene Drive in Sandy, Utah, together with sufficient fiirniture, 
furnishings, appliances and personal property and effects located thereon necessary for the 
Petitioner to maintain said home and residence for herself and the minor child. 
2. Both parties axe awarded the temporary use and possession of the personal property 
presently in their possession with the exception that the Respondent shall be awarded the 
temporary use and possession of those items of personal property as stated in his pleadings in 
regard to his Motion for Temporary Relief, and shall make arrangements with the Petitioner to 
pick up said items of personal property. 
3. Pursuant to stipulation, both parties shall be awarded the temporary legal and physical 
custody of the minor child Erik, and the status quo shall remain in effect with the minor child 
spending approximately three nights each week with the Petitioner and three nights each week 
with the Respondent, and the remaining night with his friend. However both parties will 
cooperate with each other and make sure that the minor child is residing with the other party 
when the minor child says he is doing the same, so that the parties can continue to monitor the 
activities of the minor child. 
2 
4. The Court finds that the Petitioner's gross monthly income is $1,471.00 per month 
and the Respondent's gross monthly income is $2,300.00 per month and based thereon the 
Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner child support based upon a joint physical custody 
arrangement in the amount of $54.00 per month effective the 1st day of May, 2006, and payable 
one half by the 5th and one half by the 20th of each month. 
5. Both parties shall continue to maintain the insurances they currently have in effect 
including health, life, accident, and car insurance. It is reasonable that both parties pay one half 
of the minor child's portion of the insurance premium and one half of all non-covered medical 
and dental expenses incurred on behalf of the minor child with the exception that the Respondent 
shall pay the car insurance for the minor child and the Petitioner shall pay the health insurance 
for the Respondent and the minor child. 
6. Both parties shall continue to maintain the debts and obligations they have been 
paying except for the mortgage on the marital home and residence. Since the Respondent has 
been paying but will not be obligated to pay on a temporary basis pursuant to the orders herein. 
7. Both parties are hereby restrained from selling, encumbering or disposing of any 
marital assets or incurring any marital debts without the written consent of the other party or 
Order of the Court, except the Respondent shall be allowed to sell the car hauler and the 1995 
Silverado, and any proceeds received therefrom shall be placed in an escrow account in the name 
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of both parties or both parties attorneys so that neither party may use the same without the written 
consent of the other party. 
8. The Respondent has already removed himself from the marital home and residence 
and based thereon he is hereby restrained from entering into the marital home and residence 
except with the written consent of the Petitioner, or to retrieve his personal property and items 
awarded to him under this order. 
9. Both parties shall forthwith provide to the other parties the last three months of the 
monthly statement of all checking or savings accounts in their name or in other investments, or 
financial accounts in their name. 
10. Petitioner's request for $5,000.00 for temporary attorney's fees is hereby reserved. 
11. The Petitioner is hereby awarded the temporary use and possession of the 1998 
Blazer, the 1990 motor home and the dogs, and the Respondent is hereby awarded the temporary 
use and possession of the 2000 Olds, and the Chevrolet Corvette. 
12. The Respondent is hereby awarded the temporary use and possession of the rental 
properties located at 149 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 157 South 800 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 244 East Truman Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and 250 East Truman Avenue, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and shall be awarded the right to continue to maintain these properties, to 
collect the rent and to pay the debts and obligations against each property during the pendency of 
this matter. 
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13. Both parties are awarded the temporary sue and possession of all of their banking 
and depository accounts. The Petitioner shall submit to a vocational evaluation to be conducted 
by Saara Grizzl with the Respondent to front the costs of said evaluation and the final allocation 
of cost reserved as a trial issue. 
14. The Court finds that neither party is working full time, and that the Petitioner's 
expenses only exceed her income by approximately $500.00. The Court further finds that the 
Respondent has disposable income of approximately $400.00 per month. Based thereon the 
Petitioner is hereby awarded temporary alimony in the sum of $346.00 per month, with the same 
effective May 1st 2006, and payable one half by the 5th and one half by the 20th of each month. 
15. In regard to any tax liability for the year 2005, the Court finds that it does not have 
any information before it in regard to the same and therefore said tax liability was left out of the 
Courts calculation in regard to alimony. 
16. Any other issues not addressed herein are isserved. 
DATED this S \ ^ day of May, 2006^ 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Paul H. Liapis, Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify thatatrue and correct copy of the foregoing Order from Hearing Held hatat 
May 3, 2006 was sent this^ f^ day of May, 2006, postage pre-paid and addressed as follows: 
Paul Liapis 
Attorney at Law 
175 West 200 South 
Suite 2004 
Salt lake City, Utah 84101 
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